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I. INTRODUCTION
With the passing of Dean Gabriel M. Wilner, the University of Georgia
School of Law, the American Society of International Law, and the
international law community at large lost a great scholar and friend. I
worked with Dean Wilner over the years on many issues involving various
aspects of international law, none, however, as special as the conference we
held in 2003 for the Dean Rusk Center. This conference, The Trans-Atlantic
Relationship – Aviation Policy: Clearing the Way to a More Open Market,1
was a remarkable gathering of leading experts in the field of aviation from
the private, public, and academic sectors. We spent three exciting days
discussing aviation liberalization.
Realizing the importance of the
transatlantic relationship to both the United States and Europe, the
conference strove to move the argument of aviation liberalization forward.
In large part due to Dean Wilner’s efforts, I think the conference was a great
success.
Several years later, some of the same experts in attendance at the
conference were successful in reaching the historic U.S.–EU Air Transport
Agreement on April 30, 2007 (the 2007 Agreement).2 This Agreement,
which culminated four years of sometimes contentious negotiations between
the two parties, reduced restrictions on flights between the United States and
the European Union, promoted the efficiency of European operators by
permitting mergers among them, and overrode all existing bilateral aviation
treaties between individual members of the European Union and the United
States. The 2007 Agreement was a monumental step toward eventual
worldwide open skies, although next steps remained to be resolved. Merely
three years later, in March 2010, the same parties signed a Memorandum of
Consultation, further advancing liberalization in the trans-Atlantic aviation
market.3
1
GABRIEL WILNER ET AL., THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP—AVIATION POLICY:
CLEARING THE WAY TO A MORE OPEN MARKET (2003), available at http://digitalcommons.
law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=rusk_oc.
2
Air Transport Agreement, U.S.–EU, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter 2007
Agreement]. A copy of the U.S.–EU Agreement, along with other significant documents
concerning negotiations, is available at Air Transport Agreements, E, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/e/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
3
Memorandum of Consultations on a Protocol to Amend the Air Transp. Agreement
Between the U.S. and the European Cmty. and Its Member States (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter
2010 Agreement], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139411.pdf.
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Dean Wilner was proud of the part the Dean Rusk Center played in helping
to advance the cause of international aviation liberalization. This Article is
dedicated to my mentor, colleague, and good friend, Gabriel Wilner.
In this Article I will show that international air transport systems play a
key role in modern economies, and the U.S.–EU trans-Atlantic market has
always been a market leader. To this end I will: provide a brief historical
background of the aviation industry; discuss how bilateral agreements for air
transport came about and the industry’s move toward open skies agreements;
discuss the United States’ open skies history; explain the U.S.–EU Open
Skies Agreement, its two phases, and the role of the Joint Committee;
discuss the U.S. foreign ownership and control rules for air carriers and the
impediments to an open aviation area; review the current status of the foreign
ownership and control issue; and review some of the industry’s
commentators’ solutions for obstacles to deeper liberalization, including a
discussion of labor and security issues.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Despite the relatively rapid commercial and technological development of
aviation, most officials, scholars, and practitioners will acknowledge that the
governance of international air commerce remains stuck in the past,
operating under rules established in the aftermath of World War II when
trans-oceanic flight became commercially viable. This paradox has led to
much frustration over the past two decades and has often stymied air service
liberalization. This frustration is perhaps best summarized in a 2006 study of
the economic impact of air service liberalization:
Despite today’s trend toward global markets, free trade, the
Internet, and the economic integration of entire continents, one
of the most globalized, technology-intensive industries remains
encumbered by rules that stifle competition and prevent airlines,
communities, passengers, and shippers from benefiting to the
fullest. The “bilateral air service agreements” (ASAs) that
continue to govern much of world trade in aviation define the
terms under which airlines will link their two home territories.
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These ASAs often frustrate market growth, force users to pay a
price premium, and create a series of vested interests.4
In the early years of aviation’s history under government regulation,
many in the aviation industry believed that federal regulation was necessary
for the safety of air transportation and to develop and maintain economic
standards (i.e., fair competition). After World War II, commercial air travel
rapidly increased and, accordingly, the U.S. and European governments
organized regulatory agencies to manage and oversee a growing aviation
industry. On the U.S. side of the Atlantic, there was a more developed
commercial air carrier industry while European air carriers tended to be
government-owned and focused. Also, at the time, the United States took the
fairly unique position that the nascent civil air transportation system was a
matter of public interest. Even though the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), predecessor to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), was
primarily concerned with economic regulation during this era, “there was
equal official concern that the system provide safe, affordable and broadly
available services to the American public.”5
In 1944, the United States and its European allies began planning for
post-war civil aviation. International regulation of air transport began with
the establishment of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation.6
That convention, known as the Chicago Convention, established a
specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), to promote the orderly growth and development of
international air transport.
The Chicago Convention established a
multilateral framework for creating global procedural, technical, and safety
standards. However, with many nations struggling to rebuild their postDepression and post-war economies, language subject to broad interpretation
and protectionist elements were incorporated into the Chicago Convention.
4
INTERVISTAS-GA2 CONSULTING, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AIR SERVICE
LIBERALIZATION ES-3 (2006) [hereinafter INTERVISTAS-GA2], available at http://www.intervist
as.com/downloads/reports/20060607_EconomicImpactOfAirServiceLiberalization_FinalReport.
pdf.
5
BOOZ ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AN OPEN AVIATION AREA BETWEEN THE EU AND
THE US 8 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_
index/doc/final_report_us_bah.pdf.
6
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention], available at http://www.icao.int/icaonet/arch/doc/7300/730
0_orig.pdf.
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For example, while the United States argued for liberal aviation rights
(which ultimately were not agreed to by other states), U.S. negotiators
continued to insist on strict ownership and control laws for U.S. air carriers.
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 required that all aircraft registered in the
United States be owned and controlled by a citizen of the United States.7 In
1938, Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act that further restricted
foreign ownership of U.S. air carriers.8 Since this time U.S. ownership and
control restrictions evolved little and continue to be a source of friction
between the United States and EU. While the United States has aggressively
pursued Open Skies agreements worldwide, a major focus of this Article will
be the debate over foreign ownership and control of air carriers as a
remaining major roadblock toward a trans-Atlantic Open Aviation Area.
A. The 1944 Chicago Convention and Emergence of Bilateral Agreements
Overall, the Chicago Convention contemplated that governments would
exchange scheduled international air transport rights through ASAs. In other
words, the Chicago Convention held that no scheduled international air
service may be operated over or into the territory of another contracting state
without their express permission.9 Based on this legal framework,
government-to-government ASAs proliferated, regulating everything from
routes and frequencies to fares and ownership. These agreements most often
required the two governments to agree on terms such as routes serviced
between the two countries, approvals for pricing by the air carriers, any fifth
freedom rights,10 and ownership and control nationality requirements.
The Bermuda I bilateral, signed by the United States and the United
Kingdom in 1946, was the historical model for bilateral agreements.11 It
established a precedent for the signing of approximately 3,000 other ASAs
worldwide. Under Bermuda I, delegates from the United States and Great
Britain—at the time the two largest carriers of civilian air traffic—attempted
7

Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568.
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973.
9
Chicago Convention, supra note 6, art. 6.
10
Fifth freedom rights allow an air carrier to transport passengers from a country other than
the air carrier’s home country to a third country on routes originating or ending in the home
country. For a brief description of what are generally described as aviation “freedom rights”
see Freedom Rights, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR AVIATION AND INT’L AFFAIRS,
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/Data/freedoms.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
11
Air Services Agreement, U.S.-U.K., Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499.
8
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to resolve issues remaining from the 1944 Chicago meeting where the parties
only agreed upon the first two “freedoms” of civil air transport.12 Under
Bermuda I, the parties agreed to accept the third, fourth, and fifth freedom
rights, which had not been agreed to by the parties to the Chicago
Convention.13
The agreement specified the routes between the United States and Great
Britain that the carriers of both countries and fifth freedom rights could
serve. Carriers were free to set capacities and determine flight frequencies
within the limits of the agreement. Finally, carrier prices were set through
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), subject to the approval
of both governments.
Great Britain unilaterally terminated the Berlin I agreement in 1976,
replacing it with the Bermuda II agreement in 1977, which had more
restrictive provisions.14 Instead of allowing airlines to determine capacities
and flight frequencies on permitted routes, the Bermuda II agreement
returned to a much less liberal arrangement where the two governments
determined capacities for the carriers. It also restricted the number of airport
gateways in the United States to be served directly from London Heathrow
airport. At the same time, it permitted non-scheduled airlines to operate
between the two countries, using other airports, particularly the relatively
new airport at Gatwick.15 Finally, fifth freedom rights were substantially
more restricted under Bermuda II.

12
See International Air Transport Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387, available at http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/chicago1944b.pdf. First
freedom is the right to fly over the territory of another country. Second freedom is the right to
land for essential repairs, refueling, or to escape adverse weather conditions in another
country. These rights, along with fifth freedom rights, are often referred to as “transit” rights.
Freedoms of the Air, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/trivia/freedom
s_air.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
13
Third freedom right allows an air carrier to transport passengers and cargo from the
airline’s home country to discharge them at another country. Fourth freedom right allows an
air carrier to transport passengers from another country to the airline’s home country. These
rights are often referred to as “traffic” rights, and are typically simultaneously granted.
Freedoms of the Air, supra note 12.
14
Agreement Concerning Air Services, U.S.-U.K., July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367.
15
Id.
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B. The Movement Toward “Open Skies” Agreements
With deregulation of the airline industry in the United States in 1978,16
the U.S. government and U.S. air carriers entered into a period of oftenuneasy efforts to liberalize access to international markets by way of ASAs.
While the Belgium,17 Netherlands,18 and Germany19 protocols were quickly
adopted in 1978, removing many restrictions with these two European
partners, further negotiating efforts were limited. These early postderegulation bilateral agreements differed from the Bermuda I and Bermuda
II agreements in several significant areas:
First, they undermined the price-fixing authority of IATA by
allowing individual carriers to set prices with minimal
government oversight. Second, they specified a much wider
system of routes permitted between the two signatory countries,
typically allowing any possible third or fourth freedom route.
Third, they permitted carriers to fly extensive fifth freedom
routes, subject to third country approval (i.e., fifth freedom
routes begin or end in a third country and this third country’s
approval is required for the route to be operated).20
These early bilateral agreements are viewed as the precursor to the Open
Skies agreements that the United States began to negotiate in the 1990s.21
Air transportation plays a vital role in supporting and growing the economies
of nations, and never more so than in the last decade of the twentieth century
where technological advancements extended the range of aircraft, and air
travel became more readily available worldwide. Aviation helped lead the
16

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 18, 26, and 49 U.S.C.).
17
Protocol Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Belgium Relating to Air Transport, U.S.-Belg., Dec. 12–14, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 617.
18
Protocol Relating to the United States-Netherlands Air Transport Agreement of 1957,
U.S.-Neth., Mar. 31, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 3088.
19
Protocol Relating to the United States of America—Federal Republic of Germany Air
Transport Agreement of 1955, U.S.-Ger., Nov. 1, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 7323.
20
Christian Hofer & Martin Dresner, The United States-European Union Open Aviation
Area: The American Perspective, 46 J. TRANSP. RES. F., 129, 130 (2007), available at http://jo
urnals.oregondigital.org/trforum/article/download/1001/896.
21
Dep’t of Transp., Defining “Open Skies,” DOT Order 92-8-13, Docket No. 48130 (Aug.
5, 1992).
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way to the “globalization” of world trade, travel, and economic development,
and the globalized world economy now depends to a large degree on an
increasingly efficient and available international air transportation system.
The United States’ Open Skies policy has gone hand in hand with airline and
air transportation globalization.
Open Skies agreements establish liberal rules and regulations for
international aviation markets and focus government intervention on areas
that require regulations, such as safety, security, environment, and consumer
protection. Typically, provisions in these agreements apply to passenger and
cargo transportation and cover both scheduled and charter air services. Key
provisions in an Open Skies agreement include:
(1) Free
Market
Competition—No
restrictions
on
international route rights; number of designated airlines;
capacity; frequencies; or types of aircraft.
(2) Pricing Determined by Market Forces—A fare can be
disallowed only if both governments concur (“doubledisapproval pricing”) and only for certain, specified
reasons intended to ensure competition.
(3) Doing Business Protections—For example:
● All carriers of both countries may establish sales
offices in the other country, and convert earnings and
remit them promptly and without restrictions.
● Carriers are free to provide their own ground-handling
services (“self-handling”) or choose among competing
providers. Airlines and cargo consolidators may
arrange ground transport of air cargo and are
guaranteed access to customs services.
● User charges are non-discriminatory and based on
costs.
(4) Cooperative Marketing Arrangements—Airlines may
enter into code-sharing or leasing arrangements with
airlines of either country, or with those of third countries.
An optional provision authorizes code-sharing between
airlines and surface transportation companies.
(5) Provisions for Consultation and Arbitration—Model text
includes procedures for resolving differences that arise
under the agreement.
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(6) Liberal Charter Arrangements—Carriers may choose to
operate under the charter regulations of either country.
(7) Safety and Security—Each government agrees to observe
high standards of aviation safety and security, and to
render assistance to the other in certain circumstances.
(8) Optional 7th Freedom All-Cargo Rights—Provides
authority for an airline of one country to operate all-cargo
services between the other country and a third country, via
flights that are not linked to its homeland.22
In order to advance its international aviation policy, the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT or Department) announced in 1995 that it would
seek liberalized aviation agreements with European countries and other
partners to provide for open entry on all air routes, unrestricted capacity and
frequency on all such routes, open rights to introduce air service between any
point in the United States and any point in the partner country, the rights of
airlines to price their products and services without government restrictions,
code-sharing arrangements, as well as liberal cargo and charter rights.23
The United States currently has Open Skies agreements with over 100
countries.24
It is the policy of the United States that fully open airline
markets will provide the most competitive and price-sensitive
service for consumers. As a result, it is the Department’s
policy in international negotiations to seek agreements that do
not limit the number of carriers that may serve, the capacity
that they offer, or the prices that they charge.25

22
Open Skies Agreement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.st
ate.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm.
23
Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 21.84101 (May 3, 1995).
24
Open Skies Partners, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/
rls/othr/ata/114805.htm.
25
International Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/intlaffairs.
htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); see also Hofer & Dresner, supra note 20 (“As a result of the
open skies agreements, United States airlines enjoy largely unrestricted access to most
transatlantic aviation markets.”).
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C. Development of U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreements
Included among existing Open Skies agreements negotiated in the 1990s
were sixteen agreements between the United States and individual European
governments, thus distinguishing the importance of an open transatlantic
aviation market.26 Clearly, the United States’ relationship with our European
allies has historically been significant. Over the years it has evolved into a
close commercial and political relationship, and the United States and EU
have become each other’s largest trade and investment partners.27 Aviation
is key to the success of these transatlantic relationships.
Since the easing of the restrictive Bermuda II agreement in 1995, with the
opening of routes between the U.S. and U.K. regional airports, air carriers
from both the United States and Great Britain have seen an expansion of air
services and traffic; consequently, the economic benefits have been
significant.28 Furthermore, the 1992 EU Regulation that in essence finalized
the Single European Aviation market,29 significantly increased intraEuropean air traffic and encouraged investment in new services and low-cost
air carriers.30 The U.S. and EU air transport markets represent the two
largest air transport markets in the world. The U.S. air transport market is
the largest in the world, with the EU representing the second largest market.

26
See Air Transport Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/
ata/index.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (listing individual agreements). As of 2007 and the
signing of the 2007 Agreement, ten member states still had no Open Skies agreements with
the United States. These ten member states were: Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
27
European Union, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/coun
tries-regions/Europe-middle-east/Europe/European-union (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
28
See INTERVISTAS-GA2, supra note 4, at 14 (noting a “strong causal relationship between
liberalization, air service improvement, and international traffic”).
29
Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) (EC) (noting that aviation liberalization and
the creation of one market occurred over a period of years and that “Council Decision
87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled air services between Member States(4)
and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for scheduled air services(5)
constitute the first steps towards achieving the internal market in respect of air fares”). While
these documents directly led to the creation of the Single Aviation Market, preceding them is the
Single European Act which committed Member states to the establishment of a single internal
market comprising “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital is ensured” by December 31, 1992. Id.
30
See INTERVISTAS-GA2, supra note 4, at 15–16 (noting the regional impact and value
added).
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In 2010, the U.S. market carried over 787 million passengers,31 and the EU
market carried over 796 million passengers,32 and, the traffic between the
two markets is around 57 million passengers and forecast to continue to
grow.33 Furthermore, IATA forecasts that the North America market will
make up 25% of all scheduled air services and the EU market 24% in 2011.34
In addition to passenger services, the U.S.–EU aviation market
encompasses the most advanced air cargo network in the world. Combined,
the U.S. and EU freight fleets account for more than 71% of the world
total.35 The commodities traded via the U.S.–EU aviation market reveal a
diverse trade of pharmaceuticals, technical equipment, aerospace products,
semiconductors, and computer equipment.36 In addition, code sharing37
partnerships and airline alliances38 between U.S. and EU air carriers have
further strengthened this transatlantic aviation relationship.
Despite the positive effects of this piecemeal approach (i.e., individual
bilateral agreements) with EU countries, liberalization efforts were hindered
in December 1998 when the European Commission (EC or Commission)
sued some of these countries before the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
claiming that their Open Skies agreements improperly infringed on the
European Community’s (Community) jurisdiction.
In particular, the
Commission contended, and the ECJ agreed, that the bilateral treaties violate
31

Passengers: All Carriers – All Airports, RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.,
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 (last
visited Aug. 20, 2011).
32
Air Transport of Passengers, EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?
tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=ttr00012&plugin=1 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
33
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST FISCAL YEARS 2009–2025, at 71
(2011), available at http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2009-2025/
media/Forecast%20Tables.pdf.
34
INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASS’N, IATA ECONOMIC BRIEFING: PASSENGER AND FREIGHT
FORECASTS 2007 TO 2011, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/
economics/traffic_forecast_2007_2011.pdf.
35
BOOZ ET AL., supra note 5, at 41.
36
Id. at 43.
37
“Code sharing” is a term for the practice of multiple airlines selling space on the same
flights, where a seat can be purchased on one airline but may actually be operated by a
cooperating airline under a different flight number or airline code. 14 C.F.R. § 257.3 (2011).
38
An “airline alliance” is an agreement between two or more airlines to cooperate on a
substantial level where typically cost savings are realized by the air carriers, and air travelers
benefit from lower costs and more choices. See Dep’t of Transp., Joint Application of
Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, DOT Order 93-1-11, Docket 48342
(Jan. 11, 1993) (example of airline alliance); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308, 41309.
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EC transport regulations.39 The EC transport regulations created a complete
set of Community rules for the internal air transportation market, including
regulations on licensing of air carriers,40 access to intra-Community air
routes,41 and fares and rates for air services.42 The ECJ found that nationality
clauses, which created exclusive market rights for treaty member countries,
led to illegal discrimination by precluding airlines from other EU nations to
enter the transatlantic market.43
As a result of this decision, the European Council issued a mandate to the
Commission to negotiate an agreement with the United States which covered
all of the EU members (often referred to by the EU as an “Open Aviation
Area”), and in October 2003, the United States and the EU opened what
would eventually be successful but lengthy and often contentious
negotiations to liberalize the transatlantic aviation market.
III. U.S.–EU OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT
Upon opening negotiations, John Byerly, the lead negotiator for the
United States and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation for the
Department of State, stated that “a U.S.–EU agreement has the potential to
alter fundamentally the framework for transatlantic and global aviation and
provide the benefits of a market-oriented approach.”44 When negotiations
briefly broke down in 2004, the lead EU negotiator and Director of Air
Transport Directorate for the European Commission, Daniel Calleja, agreed
that any agreement would have global significance. He added:
39
Taken together, the following cases are considered the “Open Skies Judgment”: Case C466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Case C-467/98, Comm’n v.
Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-09519; Case C-468/98, Comm’n v. Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. I-09575;
Case C-469/98, Comm’n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I-09627; Case C-471/98, Comm’n v.
Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-09681; Case C-472/98, Comm’n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. I09741; Case C-475/98, Comm’n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. I-09797; Case C-476/98, Comm’n v.
Germany, 2002 E.C.R. I-09855.
40
Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1.
41
Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8.
42
Council Regulation 2409/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 15.
43
See, e.g., Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-09427; Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002
E.C.R. I-09519; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TRANSATLANTIC AVIATION:
EFFECTS OF EASING RESTRICTIONS ON U.S.–EUROPEAN MARKETS (2004), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04835.pdf.
44
US & EU Hold Talks on Transatlantic Air Services Agreement, AMCHAM NOR. (Oct. 7,
2010), http://www.amcham.no/us--eu-hold-talks-on-transatlantic-air-services-agreement/678.
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Our negotiations are being followed with keen interest by other
nations around the world because whatever we agree has the
potential to set the benchmark for the future regulation of the
international air transport industry.
That is quite a
responsibility. And that is why we must consider not only the
level of, and conditions for, market opening that we wish to
achieve between us, but also the level of market opening that
we aim for worldwide.45
Unfortunately, it would take over four years to reach any agreement. The
desire of European carriers to have ownership and control rights in the
United States, and the U.S. government’s inability to grant that access,
delayed and nearly derailed a final accord. Furthermore, the issue of foreign
ownership and control of air carriers remained an unresolved and sensitive
issue. The agreement was finally reached in 2007.
A. First Stage Open Skies Agreement46
As approved on April 30, 2007, the 2007 Agreement replaced all existing
bilateral agreements between the United States and EU Members.47 The new
agreement recognized one large European market and provided for every
U.S. and every EU air carrier to:
●
●
●

Fly between every city in the European Union and every
city in the United States;48
Operate without restrictions on flights, routes, and
aircraft;49
Set prices based on the market and without government
interference;50 and

45
Daniel Calleja, Dir., Air Transp. European Comm’n, Address at the International
Aviation Club (Nov. 16, 2004), available at http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2004/0
41116dc.htm.
46
In 2007, the author prepared a Note on this historic development for the American
Society of International Law: Charles A. Hunnicutt, Introductory Note on US–EU Open Skies
Agreement, 46 I.L.M. 467 (2007).
47
While approved in 2007, the agreement has only been applied since March 30, 2008.
2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 25.
48
Id. art. 3, para. 1(a).
49
Id. para. 1(b).
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Enter into cooperative agreements between airlines,
regardless of country of operation.51

The new provisions were expected to have several key effects on the
trans-Atlantic aviation environment. By doing away with traditional bilateral
agreements, for the first time every European airline would be able to fly
from any city in Europe to any city in the United States—irrespective of that
airline’s country of origin. These rights have provided consumers with more
price and service options.52
The 2007 Agreement has also facilitated needed consolidation in the
European airline industry by allowing European airlines to merge or acquire
other airlines without compromising their U.S. routes. Additionally, the
2007 Agreement established a Joint Committee to meet at least once per year
to ensure its implementation, resolve any disputes arising from the 2007
Agreement, and recommend areas for further development or amendment
thereto.53 To date, the Joint Committee has met eight times and discussed
specific or technical issues covered by the 2007 Agreement, including safety,
security, and legal issues (e.g., discussion of aviation security measures in
light of the December 25, 2009, attempted passenger bomb, updates of court
decisions and regulatory rule-makings, and review of reports by working
groups of the Committee, most notably the Legal Working Group regarding
the conditions and procedures for “accession” by Iceland and Norway to the
Agreement). A more detailed discussion of the Joint Committee is set forth
in Part IV.
Finally, the 2007 Agreement opened London Heathrow Airport to all
airlines; this was potentially the most important and lucrative effect of the
negotiations. In doing so, the United States finally achieved an end to the
restrictive provisions of the Bermuda II Agreement by opening Heathrow
Airport to all U.S. air carriers from any U.S. city. In return, the EU
succeeded in obtaining U.S. recognition of European air carriers as
50

Id. art. 13, para. 1.
Id. art. 10, para. 1.
52
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Office of the Sec’y, Notice of United Air Lines, Inc. and
Aer Lingus Limited of Additional Code-Share Service, Docket 2008-0176 (Feb. 17, 2009). Aer
Lingus received approval to offer daily service between Washington Dulles Airport and Madrid,
Spain, beginning March 28, 2010. Aer Lingus, United Airlines Code Share Agreement (Jan. 7,
2010), available at http://www.aerlingus.com/aboutus/investorrelations/pressreleases/2010press
releases/UA_070109_FINAL.pdf.
53
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 52, art. 18.
51
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“Community Airlines” owned by Europeans with the right to fly from any
European city to any U.S. city.
Despite these positive effects, this initial agreement did not address some
important issues for the trans-Atlantic relationship and for aviation
agreements more broadly. Although the EU Commission pressed hard for
greater liberalization of the U.S. domestic market throughout the
negotiations, the United States was unable to address those concerns.
Specifically, the United States rejected any attempt to reduce U.S. ownership
and control laws pertaining to the ownership of U.S. air carriers. In the
United States, foreign entities cannot control a U.S. carrier, nor can they own
more than 25% of voting, or, pursuant to case law, 49% of total, shares in a
U.S. carrier. EU restrictions limit foreign entities to owning no more than
49% of any shares in an EU carrier as long as a European company
maintains effective control. This increasingly contentious issue is discussed
in further detail in Part V.
Despite the historic significance of the 2007 Agreement, those key issues
remained unresolved. Thus, as finalized, it called for the parties to initiate
further meetings by May 2008 to negotiate a second stage agreement and
further liberalize the aviation industry. If a second accord was not reached
by 2010, the first stage agreement allowed either party to “suspend rights
specified in [the 2007] Agreement.”54
1. Joint Report on Trans-Atlantic Alliance Progress
On November 16, 2010, the Commission and the DOT issued a joint
report titled, “Transatlantic Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and
Regulatory Approaches,”55 which examined the competitive structures of the
airline industries in Europe and the United States. The report finds that
the competitive structures of the airline industries are similar.
Despite important differences in legal regimes, the report finds
that there is scope for the Commission and DOT to work
towards the promotion of compatible regulatory approaches, as

54

2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21.
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND
REGULATORY APPROACHES (2010), available at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50Role_fil
es/JointAllianceReport.pdf.
55
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specified in Annex 2 to the [2007] Agreement, to achieve procompetitive outcomes for consumers and the airline industry.56
Among its conclusions, the report found that the 2007 Agreement has
increased competition in the transatlantic market:
The most immediate effect of the EU–U.S. Air Transport
Agreement was to introduce more competition in transatlantic
markets. The provisional implementation of the Agreement as
of end of March 2008 led to capacity and structural changes.
While overall capacity has decreased in the U.S.–EU market
since 2007 likely due to economic conditions, there has been a
diversification of services. On the U.S.–London Heathrow
routes, departures are up 15.3% versus 2007 and overall seats
have increased by 8.7%. Given the economy, new services on
the U.S.-London Heathrow routes account for much of the
changed landscape. Carriers now provide more frequencies
and serve more destinations in the United States from London
Heathrow.57
The report also cites progress under the European nationality clause in the
Agreement, which allows all EU airlines the right to operate from any point
in the EU (i.e., even outside their home country) to the United States. It
notes that both British Airways and, briefly, Air France, have operated routes
to the United States from outside their home territories.58
The report acknowledges that the formalization of cooperation on
competition matters between the EU and the U.S. on aviation matters is
another significant result of the 2007 Agreement:
Annex 2 to the Agreement allows for general exchange of
views and experience between the two authorities and aims at
inter alia reducing the potential conflicts in the application of
56
Press Release, European Comm’n, Competition: European Commission and U.S.
Department of Transportation Publish Report on Transatlantic Alliances (Nov. 16, 2010),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1511&format=PDF
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
57
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 55, at 12 (footnote omitted).
58
Id.
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the competition regimes in the EU and U.S. and promoting
compatible regulatory approaches through a better
understanding of the methodologies, analytical techniques and
remedies used in the respective competition reviews of the
Commission and DOT.59
The report concludes that cooperation on competitive matters is
“fruitful.”60
Given the significance of changes and new opportunities under the 2007
Agreement, its full effects still cannot be evaluated and it will likely take
several more years for the market to fully adjust. With the positive progress
cataloged in this report, the parties moved forward with the second stage
negotiations for further liberalization of the market.
B. Second Stage Open Skies Agreement
Almost immediately after the United States and the European Union signed
the 2007 Open Skies Agreement, negotiations began on further “second stage”
liberalization efforts.61 On March 25, 2010, after eight rounds of negotiation,
negotiators reached a second stage Agreement (2010 Agreement). The most
immediate effect of this Agreement is that the parties agreed to make
permanent the 2007 Agreement. Prior to this concession, Great Britain
insisted on inserting a clause in the 2007 Agreement that would allow either
party to suspend the terms of the Agreement unless certain issues (i.e., U.S.
restrictions on foreign ownership) were addressed in the second stage
negotiations.62 This “suspension clause” was removed from the 2010
Agreement; thus the rights agreed to in 2007 have become established.63
As approved, the 2010 Agreement provides for further liberalization and
cooperation in aviation security, safety, competition, and ease of travel. This
agreement improves regulatory cooperation in the following areas:
59

Id.
Id.
61
Second stage negotiations began in May 2008, less than sixty days after the first stage
agreement came into effect. This timetable was foreseen in the first stage agreement, which
established a detailed framework for the second stage negotiations, including a list of priority
topics for discussion. 2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21.
62
Id.
63
2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 6 (replacing Article 21 of the 2007
Agreement).
60
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Environmental—Cooperation to address the local and
global
environmental
challenges
by
fostering
compatibility, consistency and avoiding duplication
between their respective emission trading schemes. In
addition, the parties have stated their commitment to
cooperation on green technologies, fuels, and air traffic
management innovation and to joint efforts in ICAO to
address the climate change impact of international air
services.64
Security—Further cooperation on aviation security via the
Joint Committee with a goal of achieving maximum
reliance on each party’s security measures and avoiding
duplication. The cooperation will include coordinated
responses to new threats and consultations prior to
introducing additional measures, as well as a “reciprocal
recognition of regulatory decisions.”65
Fitness and Citizenship—Under the 2010 Agreement,
there will be reciprocal recognition of regulatory
determinations with regards to air carrier fitness and
citizenship. Thus, U.S. authorities will rely on EU
Member states’ regulatory decisions that an EU air carrier
is financially fit and European-owned when dealing with
applications from EU air carriers.66
U.S. Government Transportation—Under the 2010
Agreement, EU air carriers will have the right previously
restricted under the “Fly America” program, to sell tickets
to contractors of the U.S. government and partial ability to
transport U.S. government officials.67

One historic breakthrough is an article in which both parties agree to be
guided in the implementation of the full agreement in a manner that does not
undermine labor rights. This is the first time that an air transport agreement
includes an explicit commitment to high labor standards.68 “The Parties
64
65
66
67
68

Id. art. 3 (replacing Article 15 of the 2007 Agreement).
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 2 (inserting a new Article 6 bis into the 2007 Agreement).
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 4.
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recognise the importance of the social dimension of the Agreement and the
benefits that arise when open markets are accompanied by high labour
standards” and that any opportunities provided by the Agreement should not
undermine labor standards, rights, or principles under each party’s laws.69
Finally, the 2010 Agreement further extends the role of the U.S.–EU Joint
Committee to include matters of aviation safety, air traffic management,
passenger facilitation, and the mutual recognition of regulatory decisions.70
The Joint Committee is also tasked with considering, as appropriate, “the
conditions and procedures, including any necessary amendments to this
Agreement, that would be required for additional third countries to accede to
this Agreement.”71
The most controversial aspects of the 2010 Agreement are, arguably, the
two issues that are the subject of legislative review and change. First, the
issue of lessening restrictions in the United States on foreign ownership and
control of U.S. air carriers remains unresolved. Upon legislative change in
the United States, the EU will reciprocally allow majority ownership of EU
air carriers by U.S. nationals.72 Second, the right for EU air carriers to fly
between the United States and a number of non-European countries (i.e.,
seventh freedom rights), as well as the removal of obstacles for European
majority investment in third country-airlines by facilitating access to the U.S.
market, have not been resolved. The United States will grant these rights
once changes occur in the EU that provide a balanced approach, enforceable
at the EU level for noise operating restrictions at airports.73 Both sides have
committed to continuing to work on these issues,74 but have also
acknowledged that there was no “timetable” or “deadlines” for resolving
these outstanding matters.75
69

Id. (amending Article 17 of the 2007 Agreement).
Id. art. 5 (amending or replacing certain paragraphs of Article 18 of the 2007 Agreement).
71
Id. Notably, the Joint Committee is already reviewing the process and procedures for
accession by Iceland and Norway. Eventually, the Committee will likely have to address the
issue of accession to the Agreement of Canada and Mexico, partners to the North American
Free Trade Agreement with the United States. There have been other movements toward
establishing and maintaining common aviation markets. See, e.g., Single Aviation Market
Arrangements, Austl.-N.Z., Sept. 19, 1996, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/sam.pdf.
72
2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 6.
73
Id.
74
Id. art. 5.
75
James Kanter & Nicola Clark, U.S. and E.U. Agree to Expand Open Skies Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at B3.
70
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While the 2010 Agreement is another positive development in the
important trans-Atlantic aviation relationship between the United States and
the European Union, the issues of foreign ownership and airport noise and
other operating restrictions are perhaps the most difficult issues preventing a
full and open aviation market.76 These issues will not be readily or easily
resolved. From the EU perspective, continuing restrictions on foreign
ownership of U.S. air carriers is viewed as an outdated regulatory constraint
that is preventing a full opening of the market. From the U.S. perspective,
the EU must obtain jurisdiction over and establish a balanced approach
methodology for airport noise regulations and lift certain night restrictions.
At the conclusion of the Agreement negotiations, lead negotiators for both
the United States and the European Union acknowledged that they kept
butting up against existing laws that limited how much could be achieved on
these issues.77 However, success in these areas depends on both sides of the
Atlantic addressing these issues. Even with the already visible positive
results of the 2010 Agreement, such advancements do not appear to be
sufficient for either the EU Parliament or the U.S. Congress to further
advance trans-Atlantic air transport liberalization at this time. What must
occur first is the building of a broader consensus among the policymakers.
The members of the EU Parliament are already asking the EU
Commission to begin a third stage of negotiations with the hopes of a further
liberalizing agreement no later than December 31, 2013.78 While laudable,
the remaining issues to negotiate may prove more difficult to resolve, and
unfortunately require more time to change longstanding opposition of
legislators in both the United States and the European Union. Before we turn
to the issue of U.S. foreign ownership and control, we will focus on the
U.S.–EU Joint Committee that may lay the ground work for the cooperation
needed to solve these larger issues. This Committee, formed under the 2007
Agreement, was given further authority under the 2010 Agreement,79 and is
responsible for resolving questions related to the interpretation or application
of the 2007 Agreement, reviewing the implementation of the 2007
76

It should be noted that cabotage restriction is another area of disagreement, but is omitted
from discussion in this Article.
77
See 2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 21.
78
European Parliament Calls for EU–US Open Skies Progress, CAPA CTR. FOR AVIATION
(June 18, 2010), http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/european-parliament-calls-for-eu-usopen-skies-progress-53193.
79
2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5.
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Agreement, and facilitating greater co-operation between the parties. Its
charter and its functioning to date deserve greater attention.
IV. U.S.–EU JOINT COMMITTEE
The Joint Committee, which was created by the 2007 Agreement,80 is
unique in the sense that none of the Open Skies bilateral agreements signed
by the United States to date provide for the creation of such a committee.81
Not even the other multilateral open skies accord signed by the United
States, the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of
International Air Transportation (MALIAT) with New Zealand, Singapore,
Brunei, and Chile, later joined by Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, and
Mongolia,82 provides for such a committee.83
However, given the
complexities of dealing with multiple partners, i.e., the European Community
and its twenty-seven Member States, the EU requested that the Committee be
instituted to improve communication, discussions, and decisions between the
United States on one side, and the EU members on the other side. The 2010
Agreement further extends the role of the Committee, and the industry has
viewed the 2010 Agreement as a positive step toward achieving the goals of
the 2007 Agreement.
The Committee is a body consisting of representatives of the signatory
parties that monitors the implementation of the 2007 Agreement and
coordinates the various work streams of regulatory cooperation.84 It is
chaired jointly by a representative of the European Community and its
Member States and by a representative of the United States.85 The U.S.
delegation consists of multi-agency representation, chaired by the
Department of State.86 The EU delegation consists of the European
Community and its Member States.87
80

2007 Agreement, supra note 2, art. 18.
See Air Transport Agreements, supra note 26 (containing links to the texts of the Open
Skies Agreements and Air Transport Agreements signed by the United States).
82
MALIAT, http://www.maliat.govt.nz/country/matrix.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
Peru joined in 2002 but withdrew in 2005. Id.
83
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation, May 1,
2001, 2001 U.S.T. LEXIS 69 [hereinafter MALIAT].
84
2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Memorandum of Consultations, U.S.–EU (Mar. 2, 2007), para. 37, available at http://
81
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Since its inception, the Committee has met at least once a year, and has
developed methodologies to address specific or technical issues covered by
the 2007 Agreement, including, safety, security, and legal issues. The
Committee’s new extended roles implemented by the 2010 Agreement will
increase compatibility of regulatory regimes between the United States and
the Member States of the European Union. These roles will streamline the
work of the Committee and further improve exchange of information,
discussions, and resolutions among the multiple parties, and, accordingly,
deepen air service freedoms.
The 2010 Agreement created four important new roles for the Committee
and clarified one important regulatory responsibility, in addition to the roles
created by the 2007 Agreement.88 First, the Committee is now in charge of
“fostering cooperation between the respective authorities of the Parties in
efforts to develop their respective air traffic management systems with a
view toward optimising the interoperability and compatibility of those
systems, reducing costs, and enhancing their safety, capacity, and
environmental performance.”89 Second, the Committee will promote the
“development of proposals for joint projects and initiatives in the field of
aviation safety, including with third countries.”90 Third, it will be the
Committee’s responsibility to encourage “continued close cooperation
among the relevant aviation security authorities of the Parties, including
initiatives to develop security procedures that enhance passenger and cargo
facilitation without compromising security.”91 Fourth, the Committee will
consider “whether the Parties’ respective laws, regulations, and practices in
areas covered by Annex 9 of the [1944 Chicago] Convention (Facilitation)
may affect the exercise of rights under this [2007] Agreement.”92
Additionally, the Committee is now tasked with “developing, where
requested by the Parties, arrangements for the reciprocal recognition of
regulatory determinations.”93

www.state.gov/documents/organization/114892.pdf.
88
See 2010 Agreement, supra note 3, attachment B, art. 5 (replacing art. 18 of the 2007
Agreement).
89
Id. art. 5, para. 4(f).
90
Id. para. 4(g).
91
Id. para. 4(h).
92
Id. para. 4(i).
93
Id. para. 4(e) (amending art. 18, para. 4(e) of the 2007 Agreement).
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Further, the Committee will continue to review the overall
implementation of the 2007 Agreement, including any effects of aviation
infrastructure constraints on the exercise of traffic rights, the effects of
security measures taken pursuant to the terms of Article 9 of the 2007
Agreement, the effects on the conditions of competition, including in the
field of global distribution systems, and any social effects (i.e., labor
standards and rights) of the implementation of the 2007 Agreement. As an
additional and important feature the 2010 Agreement introduced, which will
reduce the red tape regarding the implementation of the 2007 Agreement, the
Committee will now consider “individual issues or proposals that either
Party identifies as affecting, or having the potential to affect, operations
under the [2007] Agreement, such as conflicting regulatory requirements.”94
The creation of the Committee has allowed a seamless exchange of
information among the parties and has functioned successfully to implement
the goals of the 2007 Agreement. For instance, the parties to the Committee
have fostered positive security measures that will benefit the U.S. and EU
aviation markets and the entire industry, which resulted from the continued
cooperation among the parties involved.95 Also, the Committee serves as a
forum for each party to discuss its questions and concerns over the other
party’s local proposals that may adversely affect the 2007 Agreement or the
aviation industry, to understand the other party’s position regarding specific
issues, and to cooperate with each other to reach a decision that will strike a
balance between the terms of the 2007 Agreement and the parties’ laws and
regulations.96 Areas that the Committee is likely to consider in some manner
in the future include: aviation security, air cargo, cargo security, explosive
detection, competition, consumer protection, U.S. regulation of foreign repair
stations, ground handling, slot regulation, the U.S.–EU Aviation Safety
Agreement, third-country air carrier assessment, and the impact of FAA
Reauthorization legislation.
Since its inception, the Committee has addressed several issues, including
security and environmental concerns, which tend to delay the aviation
94

Id. para. 3 (amending art. 18, para. 3 of the 2007 Agreement).
See, e.g., U.S.–EU Joint Committee Record of Meeting, Jan. 14, 2010, available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/137493.pdf.
96
2010 Agreement, supra note 3, para. 23; see also Record of Seventh Meeting of the EU–
U.S. Joint Committee (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organizat
ion/144199.pdf; Record of Eighth Meeting of the EU–U.S. Joint Committee (Nov. 17, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/151670.pdf.
95
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industry from moving to further market liberalization. The Committee could
serve as a model for future multilateral agreements, especially when the
aviation industry moves from bilateral agreements to a broader market/region
reach (e.g., Latin America, Asia, etc.). Of course, the success of future
committees depends on each party’s willingness to work together to reach
the goals of air service freedoms while allowing for secure, safe air
operations that are also as environmentally friendly as possible.
V. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AIR CARRIERS
In addition to the issues outlined above, the United States and the
European Union confronted another major issue when negotiating the 2010
Agreement. Leading up to the second stage negotiations, the EU called for
an Open Aviation Area with unlimited rights for U.S. and EU citizens to own
and control airlines organized in the other’s territory.97 As discussed below,
airline ownership and control was as difficult for the United States and the
European Union throughout the second stage negotiations as it had been in
the first stage.
A. Restrictions on Foreign Ownership in the United States
The United States maintains a longstanding policy that U.S. citizens own
U.S. air carriers.98 The first citizenship requirements date back to the postWorld War I era, when Congress was concerned that foreign ownership of
U.S. carriers would threaten national security. In 1926, Congress passed the
Air Commerce Act, which set forth aircraft registration requirements and
stated that the owner of registered aircraft had to be a “citizen of the United
States.”99 At that time, the term “citizen of the United States” was defined as
either a U.S. citizen, a U.S. partnership in which all partners were U.S.
citizens, or a U.S. corporation for which both the president and at least two-

97
John R. Byerly, Deputy Asst. Sec’y for Transp. Affairs, Dep’t of State, Remarks at the
ACI-NA International Aviation Issues Seminar: U.S. International Aviation Policy and
Challenges (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.aci-na.org/static/entransit/iacbyerly1.pdf.
98
Josh Cavinato, Note, Turbulence in the Airline Industry: Rethinking America’s Foreign
Ownership Restrictions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 311, 315 (2008).
99
Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
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thirds of the board of directors were U.S. citizens and where at least 51% of
the voting shares were controlled by U.S. citizens.100
During the Great Depression, Congress strengthened restrictions on
foreign ownership of U.S. carriers even further by requiring that at least 75%
of all voting shares be “owned or controlled by persons who are citizens of
the United States.”101 The purpose behind the stricter ownership requirement
was to ensure that U.S. airmail contracts would only be awarded to U.S.
citizens and to prevent hostile foreign citizens or their governments from
owning U.S. carriers.102
These restrictions were retained in 1958 when Congress adopted the
Federal Aviation Act.103 During this period, Congress was concerned with
developing the domestic air transportation system. Moreover, since the
United States was in the middle of the Cold War, the U.S. Government was
interested in developing a system that was designed to protect the country
and defend national security.104
More recently, in 2003, Congress amended the ownership requirement
again.105 This latest amendment reflected the longstanding practice of granting
certificates only to those air carriers owned and controlled by U.S. citizens.106
Currently, in order to provide air transportation under the U.S. flag, a carrier
must hold a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the
DOT.107 The Department will only grant such certificates to citizens of the
United States.108 The term “citizen of the United States” is defined as:
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual
who is a citizen of the United States; or
(C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of
the United States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a
100

Id. § 9(a).
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 13, 52 Stat. 973, 978 (1938).
102
Sheri Linzell, Ownership and Control Restrictions in U.S. Aviation Law, 35 AIR & SPACE
L. 379, 382 (2010).
103
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 101, 72 Stat. 731, 737–38 (1958).
104
Linzell, supra note 102, at 382.
105
Cavinato, supra note 98, at 315.
106
Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-76, § 807, 117
Stat. 2490, 2588 (2003).
107
49 U.S.C. § 41.101(a)(1).
108
Id. § 41.102(a).
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territory or possession of the United States, of which the
president and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and
other managing officers are citizens of the United States, which
is under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and
in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or
controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States.109
Consequently, if a corporation seeks a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to operate as a U.S. air carrier, it must be formed and organized
in one of the States, or a U.S. possession or territory, its president, and no
less than two thirds of the members sitting on the board of directors, as well
as its managing officers, must be U.S. citizens, the corporation must be under
the control of U.S. citizens, and no less than 75% of its voting interest must
be owned or controlled by U.S. citizens. Each of these criteria must be met
at all times in order to maintain eligibility to hold a certificate and operate as
a U.S. carrier.
In regard to the “actual control” aspect of the restriction, the DOT applied
a test pursuant to which meeting only the requisite ownership percentages
was not sufficient for an airline to qualify as a U.S. citizen.110 For example,
in a couple of earlier cases, the DOT’s predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), found that (1) an applicant did not qualify as a U.S. carrier
where the applicant only met the bare minimum ownership requirements and
did not fulfill its burden of establishing that its governance was in
accordance with the actual control policy;111 (2) an applicant was under
foreign control where the applicant’s founder used a $2.5 million loan from
his Saudi Arabian employer to fund the carrier;112 and (3) an applicant’s
foreign, nonvoting stockholders could influence the applicant’s crucial
decisions because they had the power to block any of the voting
stockholders’ proposals by choosing to dissolve the company.113 In other
words, “if persons other than U.S. citizens, individually or collectively, can
109

Id. § 40.102(a)(15).
Bimal Patel, A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability–The History and Future of
Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States Aviation Industry, 73 J. AIR L. & COM.
487, 490 (2008).
111
Willye Peter Daetwyler, 58 C.A.B. 118 (1971).
112
Premiere Airlines, 95 C.A.B. 101 (1982).
113
Page Avjet, 102 C.A.B. 488, 2–3 (1983); see also Patel, supra note 110, at 490–91
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significantly influence the affairs of the [applicant], it is not a U.S.
citizen.”114
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a shift in the DOT’s focus.
National security, while still a primary concern, became only part of the
analysis. The DOT also became concerned with permitting economic
partnerships.115 The Northwest/KLM and Continental/Air Canada matters
illustrate this shift in focus.116 In each matter, a foreign airline sought to
invest in a U.S. airline. KLM was ultimately permitted to hold a 49% equity
stake in Northwest, provided it was non-voting, and KLM could maintain
three members on Northwest’s board since the other twelve members would
offset any potential adverse effects.117 Acceptance of this arrangement
helped pave the way for the United States and the Netherlands to enter into
the first open skies agreement.118 In the Continental matter, the DOT
approved a financing plan under which Air Canada would invest $235
million and receive 27.5% equity and 24% of Continental’s voting stock.119
Further, Air Canada could select six of Continental’s eighteen board
members.120 Some believe that the arrangement was approved, in part,
because Air Canada’s partner was a major U.S. investment group.121
DOT decisions issued in the aftermath of the events of September 11,
2001, cast some doubt on the more current trend in actual control according
to some commentators.122 In the DHL/ASTAR matter, the U.S. DOT stated
that the ability to exercise actual control over an airline implies having “a
substantial ability to influence the carrier’s activities.”123 In addition, the
DOT applied a totality-of-the-circumstances test when conducting the actual
114
Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of Intera Artic Services, Inc., DOT Order 87-8-43, Docket
No. 44723 (Aug. 8, 1987); Patel, supra note 110, at 491.
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Patel, supra note 110, at 492–93; ISABELLE LELIEUR, LAW AND POLICY OF SUBSTANTIAL
OWNERSHIP AND EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF AIRLINES 37 (2003).
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Patel, supra note 110, at 492.
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Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of Northwest Airlines, Inc., DOT Order 91-1-41, Docket
No. 46371 (Jan. 23, 1991); Patel, supra note 110, at 492–93. In addition, Northwest’s
Chairman had to be a U.S. citizen and the Department would continue to scrutinize carefully
the committee composition.
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Patel, supra note 110, at 493.
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Id. at 494.
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Id. (citing LELIEUR, supra note 115, at 38).
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Dep’t of Transp., In the matter of DHL Airways, Inc., DOT Order 2004-5-10, Docket
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control analysis.124 The DOT ultimately held that ASTAR’s dependence on
DHL’s extensive network for the majority of its business would not give
DHL substantial influence over ASTAR.125 Some have questioned this
decision in terms of whether DHL passed the control test because of DHL’s
and its advisors’ political influence.126 In the Virgin America case, a U.S.
limited liability company held 75% of the applicant’s voting equity.127 More
than 49% of the limited liability company’s equity was held by Cayman
Island entities or foreign limited partnerships, i.e., by Sir Richard Branson
and the Virgin Group.128 Hedge funds, involving foreign investors, also
owned a large share of the limited liability company.129 After the DOT
initially denied the application, Virgin America assured the DOT that the
foreign investors in the hedge funds would be completely excluded from
investing in Virgin America.130 The DOT later approved the transaction
because Virgin America agreed to place the equity held by the Virgin Group
into an irrevocable voting trust that was subject to strict conditions,131 and it
walled off foreign investors within the hedge funds.132 Virgin America was
further constrained to remove Virgin Group’s veto power over material
contracts and capital expenditures, which the DOT found to have provided a
degree of influence over the applicant.133 It also agreed to replace Fred Reid
as CEO within six months of commencing operations, since the DOT
suspected him of having close ties to the foreign principals within the Virgin
Group.134 Changes were also made to Virgin America’s bylaws and board of
directors in order to remove voting powers resting with some non-U.S.
entities.135
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According to some observers, the DHL and Virgin America matters
indicate that, while slow, the DOT may be pursuing a progressively liberal
interpretation of the statutory ownership and control requirements.136
B. More Liberal Ownership Rights in the European Union
Given its unique nature as a group of Member States, the EU ownership
requirements developed quite differently from those in the United States.
The European Commission adopted an initial air transport memorandum in
July 1979 that set forth the overall issues facing the European airline industry
and outlined new policies, including the liberalization of bilateral restrictions
on ownership.137 In March 1984, the Commission adopted a second
memorandum on the airline industry in which it rejected the type of
deregulation that had recently occurred in the United States on the grounds
that the European Community (EC) involved a different type of market.138
The Commission proposed instead that the long-term objective for the EC
was the creation of a common air transport market.139
The next set of aviation initiatives, known as the Third Package, was
adopted in 1992 and became effective on January 1, 1993. It contained the
last step in developing a single European aviation market. The Third
Package included Council Regulation 2407/92, which set forth requirements
concerning the issuance of operating licenses by Member States to air
carriers that were established and operating in the EC. The adoption of
Council Regulation 2407/92 entitled Community citizens and organizations
to operate air carriers throughout the EC without discrimination on the
grounds of nationality if Community citizens owned and controlled the
majority of the organization.140
Due to a number of changes to Council Regulation 2407/92 and other
regulations relating to airline operations in the European Union, the common
rules for the operation of air services were recast during 2008 and a new
regulation, Council Regulation 1008/2008, was issued. It remains in force
136
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today. Currently, an entity must meet the following conditions, among
others, in order to obtain an operating license from a Member State:
(a) its principal place of business is located in that Member
State;
(b) it holds a valid AOC [Air Operator’s Certificate] issued
by a national authority of the same Member State whose
competent licensing authority is responsible for granting,
refusing, revoking or suspending the operating license of the
Community air carrier; . . .
(f) Member States and/or nationals of Member States own
more than 50% of the undertaking and effectively control it,
whether directly or indirectly through one or more intermediate
undertakings, except as provided for in an agreement with a
third country to which the Community is a party . . . .141
Council Regulation 1008/2008 defines the term “effective control” as:
a relationship constituted by rights, contracts or any other
means which, either separately or jointly and having regard to
the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the
possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive
influence on an undertaking, in particular by:
(a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking;
(b) rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on
the composition, voting or decisions of the bodies of an
undertaking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the
running of the business of the undertaking.142
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Council Regulation 1008/2008, art. 4, 2008 O.J. (L 293) 3 (EC). It should be noted that a
few airlines, which did not meet the Community’s ownership requirements, were granted
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The EU’s airline ownership and control restrictions are not as stringent as
the U.S. restrictions de facto.143 An organization complies with the EU’s
ownership requirements if its principal place of business is located in a
Member State, nationals of the Member States own more than 50% of the
entity, and nationals of the Member State control the entity by possessing the
right to exercise influence over the entity directly or indirectly (e.g., use all
or some of its assets or having influence over voting or decisions of the
bodies of the entity or managing the entity’s business). This standard may
actually be more stringent than the U.S. standard from a purely de jure
review.
While the term “ownership” is not specifically defined in the regulation, a
European Commission decision from July 19, 1995, in proceedings relating
to the Swissair/Sabena matter explained that the notion of ownership of an
entity
is essentially based on the notion of equity capital. Holders of
such capital normally have the right to participate in decisions
affecting the management of the undertaking as well as to share
in the residual profits or, in the event of liquidation, in the
residual assets of the undertaking after all other obligations
have been met . . . . If, however, capital does not confer upon
its holders any of the two abovementioned rights to an
appreciable extent, it must generally be disregarded in
determining the ownership situation of an undertaking.144
Although ownership and control requirements will be assessed on a caseby-case basis, the majority ownership requirement is met, for example, if
51% of the shares or equity capital of an air carrier is in EU-member hands at
all times.145 Consequently, non-EU parties may hold 49% of an entity’s
voting shares or equity capital, and the entity can still meet the EU
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ownership requirements.146 This is far more than the 25% limit on voting
shares set forth in the U.S. ownership and control restrictions.147
C. Point of Contention Between the United States and the European Union
The second stage of the U.S.–EU Open Skies negotiations dealt with
difficult issues, making that stage of negotiations particularly important.148
From the EU’s perspective, the foreign ownership and control issue had to be
addressed. As it had done before during the first stage, the EU continued to
demand “unlimited cabotage, unlimited rights for each side’s citizens to own
and control airlines of the other parties, [and] extensive regulatory
convergence.”149
The European Union has long pressed for such reform. Its position is
“based on the positive experience [from integrating] the EU internal
market.”150 During negotiations, the EU asserted that ownership and control
reform “would represent a key step towards liberating the airline industry
from the outdated regulatory constraints in the area of foreign investment
that prevent [the airline industry] from acting like any other industry.”151
U.S. negotiators, however, knew these goals could not be accomplished
by the deadline looming over the process.152 The changes considered
necessary to address the demands of the European Union would require an
amendment to the U.S. statute limiting foreign ownership and control of
U.S.-flagged airlines.153 The United States decided to use the second stage
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of the negotiations to explore the issue of foreign ownership and control.154
This led to an “examination of the traditional nationality clause in bilateral
air services agreements.”155
VI. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY REGARDING FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL
Rather than directly address the key issue of reforming airline ownership
and control rules, the 2010 Agreement included a commitment to engage in a
process toward removing market access barriers and enhancing airlines’
access to global capital markets.156 In the end, the EU recognized that
changes in investment and control must come from the U.S. Congress, and if
any reform is to be adopted, it will take time.157 Consequently, the 2010
Agreement sets out incentives that will encourage reform. For example,
when the United States changes its legislation to allow EU investors majority
ownership of U.S. airlines, the EU will reciprocally allow majority
ownership of U.S. airlines.158 If reform is achieved, U.S. airlines will also
benefit from additional market access rights to and from the EU.159 The
parties have also agreed to review progress toward this goal regularly.160 If
either side fails to make progress on its promises, the other can freeze new
market access.161 It is unlikely that these incentives alone are sufficient to
bring about changes to the U.S. ownership and control restrictions.
Moreover, as discussed below, many issues, including national security,
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labor, and how to gain congressional support, must be addressed before any
such reforms will be adopted.
Article 21 of the 2007 Agreement, as amended by the 2010 Agreement,
states
[t]he Parties commit to the shared goal of continuing to remove
market access barriers in order to maximize benefits for
consumers, airlines, labour, and communities on both sides of
the Atlantic, including enhancing the access of their airlines to
global capital markets, so as better to reflect the realities of a
global aviation industry, the strengthening of the transatlantic
air transportation system, and the establishment of a framework
that will encourage other countries to open up their own air
service markets . . . . The Joint Committee shall develop a
process of cooperation in this regard including appropriate
recommendations to the Parties.162
The overall outcome of the second-stage negotiations is generally viewed
as positive.163 The U.S. considers the regime to be a significant step forward
for the liberalization of aviation access and it provides a solid example of a
multilateral agreement that opens markets.164 Many remain disappointed,
however, with the result of the second-stage negotiations and the lack of
concrete ownership liberalization.165 Stage one critics such as British
Airways (BA) predicted that the United States would keep the best parts of
the open skies agreement intact, such as greater access for U.S. airlines to
BA’s hub at Heathrow, and refute efforts to amend foreign ownership rules
that the U.S. Congress would have never approved.166 At the end of the
second-stage negotiations, BA called on the parties to honor their
commitments and to redouble efforts on the ownership issue going
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forward.167 IATA, through its former director-general and chief executive,
Giovanni Bisignani, responded to the second-stage announcement with a
grim description of the agreement. Mr. Bisignani noted that IATA was
disappointed by the parties’ failure to make significant progress on the
ownership issue and that long-term financial sustainability of the industry is
dependent on normal commercial freedoms such as those allowing foreign
investment.168 He also urged the parties to keep the issue on their radar
screen for urgent follow-up.169
The EU continues to stress the need for reform of the ownership and
control restrictions. In preparation for the ICAO’s Assembly in early
October 2010, the EU’s Transport Commissioner, Siim Kallas, met with top
U.S. transportation officials to coordinate on security, environmental, and
other issues. When visiting Washington, D.C. for these meetings, the
Commissioner stated that the EU would continue to push for dismantling the
investment restrictions that make the aviation sector a global anomaly.170
A. U.S. Airlines Denied Access to Foreign Capital
Not all critics of the U.S. ownership restrictions are European. Many
U.S. scholars and entities are critical of the U.S. ownership and control
restrictions as well. In fact, even the DOT at one time attempted to modify
the interpretation of the foreign ownership laws in order to allow foreign
citizens to control certain aspects of an airline’s operations.171 The purpose
of the new policy was to encourage new avenues for investment and relieve
unnecessary constraints on access to capital.172 Many leaders within the
executive branch and the aviation industry voiced their support for the
proposal. Jeffrey Shane, Under Secretary for Policy at the Department,
defended the proposal when explaining to Congress that “we felt an absolute
obligation, given the amount of change that has taken place in the airline
industry, both here and abroad, to reexamine that interpretation and see
167
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whether or not, in fact, it continued to have relevance to today’s
circumstances.”173
John Byerly, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Transportation Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, underscored the
importance of the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement and noted that the two
parties could “send a message to all the world that the days of protectionist
bilateral agreements are drawing to a close, and that open markets and airline
competition represent the future.”174 FedEx’s Rush O’Keefe, Jr., Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, also testified before Congress in support of
the new policy, stating that “[t]o withdraw the policy carrot of the NPRM
would . . . signal an acquiescence to protectionism at a time when U.S.
carriers want more and not less international opportunities.”175 The Vice
President of United Airlines, Michael Whitaker explained that U.S. airlines
“are looking for opportunities to compete more effectively in that world
market, not for regulatory protection against foreign competition or foreign
investment.”176
The DOT’s efforts were not well received by Congress. It became clear
during the course of the proceedings that Congress at that time was not
prepared to amend the foreign ownership statute in order to allow a change in
Department policy. The Department ultimately withdrew its proposal.177
The main argument that opponents of the U.S. ownership regime rely on
is that the U.S. rules prevent the airline industry from gaining access to
capital the airlines desperately need for continued operations and to expand
and modernize their fleets and systems in order to compete with foreign
airlines in the global market. As is often pointed out, air carriers require
significant capital because of their business structures, which involve high
fixed costs, intensive competition, and highly cyclical demands.178 Even
though U.S. airlines require significant amounts of capital, U.S. ownership
and control requirements essentially limit them to depending mostly on the
173
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U.S. capital market.179 Since U.S. airlines cannot access foreign capital, they
struggle to compete with foreign airlines that have greater access to global
capital markets.180 Given this disadvantage, it is often argued that foreign
investment would furnish U.S. airlines with the capital they desperately
require to become financially stable and avoid layoffs of American
employees.181
Access to capital is especially important during a downturn in the
economy, such as the recent recession, when capital is particularly scarce.
Opponents to the U.S. regime maintain that no other industry in the United
States is subjected to a similar restriction on foreign investment. They argue
that there is no need to submit the U.S. aviation industry to a restraint on
cross-border investments and that the industry is treated unfairly. Even
before this issue came to the foreground in the U.S.–EU Open Skies
negotiations, some argued that U.S. airlines were going bankrupt as a result
of not being able to find investment partners that had both sufficient capital
and the ability to meet the U.S. citizenship requirements.182 Indeed, it was
estimated in 2005 that approximately one-half of all seats on U.S. airlines
were on bankrupt air carriers.183
B. Airlines Pursue Alternatives to Compete Globally
1. Alliances Requiring Antitrust Immunity
Given the restrictions on foreign investment at this time, U.S. airlines
continue to rely on alliances for access to global networks. However, these
alliances can be costly to an airline to join and maintain. Similarly, in the
EU, some observers speculate that one reason the EU allowed the
postponement of the ownership liberalization issue is that anti-trust
immunities may currently satisfy immediate EU concerns about market
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access.184 In fact, strategic alliances requiring antitrust immunity have long
been utilized as a less-than-perfect substitute for mergers that foreign
ownership laws prohibit.185 It appears that such alliances will continue to fill
in as a substitute for access to foreign investment, whether in the form of
consolidation, the infusion of capital, or both. As stated in a joint report
issued by the Department and the Commission, “Since ownership and control
restrictions will remain to limit the freedom of carriers to merge and given
that alliances result in significant benefits for carriers, global alliances and
immunized [Joint Ventures] seem likely to continue to play an important role
in transatlantic markets.”186
Alliances requiring antitrust immunity are not the ultimate answer to
airlines’ woes caused by the inefficient access to capital. While they can
provide some benefits for U.S. airlines, such as immediate access to global
networks, they can be costly to an airline to join and maintain, especially if
the airline is obligated to update or modify its systems in order to become
compatible with its alliance partners. Alliance members can be marginalized
by other members which seek to retain lucrative, long-haul routes for
themselves. In this way, becoming a member of an alliance can actually
result in limiting the potential for an airline to grow and expand its network.
Furthermore, only so many U.S. airlines can be in the same alliance before
fears of anticompetitive domestic effects will prevent other U.S. airlines
from joining an alliance. Alliance members may also experience difficulty
achieving efficiencies otherwise available under a merger such as common
management, economies of scale/scope, and a combined network.
2. Airlines Create New Arrangements
Since immunized alliances are a less-than-perfect solution for U.S.
carriers to gain access to additional sources of capital and expand their
network, airlines have resorted to creating other types of arrangements. A
184
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prime example is the arrangement between Aer Lingus and United Airlines
(United) pursuant to which these two airlines share costs and revenues in
regard to one of the city pairs, Washington, D.C.-Madrid, operated under
their codeshare agreement. This arrangement has enabled United to offer
service to its passengers on an Aer Lingus-operated flight carrying the
United code without either United or Aer Lingus separately incurring all of
the start-up costs associated with commencing such service in this previously
underdeveloped market. Without such an arrangement, neither carrier would
have commenced service to Madrid on its own. Under this unique
arrangement, United has expanded its network while saving costs and
limiting risks.187
Joint ventures outside the United States have also been used as a way to
work around the limitations on foreign investment. Mesa Airlines, a U.S.
domestic regional airline, formed a joint venture with Shenzhen Airlines to
start a new regional airline in the Chinese market.188 By teaming up with
Shenzhen Airlines on a project outside the United States, Mesa Airlines has
extended its reach without relying on direct foreign investment in its U.S.
entity.189
Consolidation among U.S. domestic carriers has become a substitute for
greater access to foreign capital. Most recently, the industry has witnessed
the Northwest/Delta merger together with the United/Continental merger.
These mergers occurred not long after the US Airways/America West
merger. Unable to expand networks on their own in order to compete with
other airlines, U.S. air carriers have resorted to mergers with other U.S.
carriers in order to obtain economies of scale and benefit from a combined
network.
At one point, air carriers also used a methodology where ownership
interests held by a foreign investment entity were “multiplied out” to
represent the total beneficial foreign ownership of a domestic airline.190 If
187
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the foreign investors’ interests were genuinely passive, and highly dispersed,
a U.S. LLC could be inserted between the air carrier and each foreign
investment entity.191 This structure was used in connection with Hawaiian
Airline’s emergence from bankruptcy because the reorganized airline
involved an ownership structure that included foreign investment entities,
and under the Department’s traditional application of the citizenship
requirements, Hawaiian would not have passed the U.S. citizen test.192
Under what became known as the “Hawaiian approach” or “Hawaiian
structure,” the new LLC owns and controls the voting stock in the air carrier
(or its parent), and independent U.S. managers who have a genuine financial
interest must hold all the voting interest in the new LLC.193 If foreign
investors hold any remaining interest, it must be non-voting.194 The DOT
accepted this approach in recognition of the fact that the foreign ownership
restrictions “imposed harmful burdens on U.S. carrier access to investment
capital.”195 The approach was acceptable if “the U.S. managers are in fact
independent decision makers and are not obliged to follow the dictates of the
offshore entities that they manage with respect to [the air carrier], whether
because of fiduciary duty or any other reason.”196
The Department’s application of the Hawaiian approach is not often seen
in public documents.197 It did appear, however, in Virgin America’s
application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, where the
Department initially found that Virgin America could not use the Hawaiian
approach, but later decided to apply that standard and determined that Virgin
America was owned and controlled by U.S. citizens once Virgin America
altered its ownership and management structure.198 Both the Hawaiian and
Virgin America matters demonstrate that U.S. carriers will resort to the
“multiplying-out approach” in order to obtain access to foreign capital.
Minority ownership probably will also continue to be a substitute for
increased access to the global capital markets.199 Lufthansa’s 19%
191
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investment in jetBlue provides access to capital for jetBlue and allows
Lufthansa to expand its U.S. route network by connecting with jetBlue’s
flights at jetBlue’s New York Kennedy Airport hub.200 As long as access to
foreign capital remains restricted, U.S. carriers will be constrained to work
around the U.S. citizenship requirements.
VII. WHAT’S NEXT FOR OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
A. Broader Liberalization
1. Potential Benefits
The United States has agreements with more than 100 Open Skies
partners, all of which contain citizenship requirements in the form of
nationality clauses.201 While the United States continues to move forward
with efforts to conclude more open skies agreements with additional trading
partners, including China, Mexico, and South Africa, some believe it is time
to seek broader liberalization under existing and future bilaterals.202
Proponents of further liberalization would relax or eliminate altogether
restrictions in the nationality clause, ownership and control restrictions, and
cabotage prohibitions, allowing all freedoms of the air.203 They envision a
completely free global market, such as exists in many other industries.204
Proponents cite to the great potential for all stakeholders, including
passengers, shippers, airlines, labor, and airports.205 Relaxing nationality
clauses, ownership and control restrictions, and allowing cabotage, for
example, could result in expanded networks and greater competition among
airlines.206 The effect would be better service, lower fares for passengers,
cheaper rates for shippers, and, of course, access to the global capital
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200
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market.207 Air transport services could increase in general, benefitting
airports and creating more jobs in all aspects of the aviation industry.208
2. Potential Risks
However, many opponents to greater liberalization fear the opposite will
occur.209 They are concerned that eliminating restrictions will result in
shrinking networks with fewer service options available to passengers and
shippers. They predict that competition among airlines would only remain in
high-demand markets and that service to markets where there is less demand
would be reduced or eliminated. Opponents also argue that if ownership and
control restrictions are relaxed, foreign airlines will gain greater ownership
rights in U.S. airlines and consolidate them with foreign airlines.210 They
claim that more consolidation will also result in less service and less
competition since there will be fewer carriers.211 With increased foreign
involvement, these carriers would not necessarily have U.S. interests in
mind. There is also apprehension that American employees in U.S. aviation
markets would be replaced with foreign employees who will accept lower
wages and are not as well trained or experienced compared to their American
counterparts. The quality and safety in air transport services would suffer.
Security issues would also arise, since the U.S. government relies on service
from airlines in national security emergencies through the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program. There is a concern that U.S. airlines owned and
controlled by foreign nationals would not support the United States during a
national emergency.
B. Solutions for Obstacles to Deeper Liberalization
While many obstacles must be overcome before embarking on efforts to
increase liberalization, commentators have offered potential solutions. The
207
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following sets forth some of those solutions. In addition to foreign
ownership and control and labor issues, other items demanding the United
States’ and the European Union’s attention are lurking on the horizon,
including streamlined visa/facilitation provisions, enhanced and harmonized
aviation security measures and capacity limits resulting from airport/air
traffic constraints, and greenhouse gas rules.212
1. Legislation
Undoubtedly, the main obstacle to increased liberalization on the U.S.
side is the current U.S. statute restricting foreign ownership and control of
U.S. airlines.213 When the Department first announced its intent in late 2005
to change U.S. policy in order to allow foreign citizens to control certain
aspects of a U.S. airline’s operations,214 some Members of Congress strongly
opposed the initiative, arguing that Congress first had to act to amend the
statute before the Department could change any policy.215
The political climate at that time would not allow any room for foreign
influence over domestic air carrier operations. At roughly the same time that
the debate on increased foreign involvement in airline operations was taking
place on Capitol Hill, a perceived scandal involving the sale of U.S. port
facilities to Dubai Port World, a United Arab Emirates entity, was also
playing out in Congress.216 At a time when the United States was debating
how to protect its ports and prevent containers with dirty bombs from
entering its territory, legislators were troubled to learn that the Bush
Administration approved a transaction they thought would put U.S. national
security interests at U.S. ports in the hands of foreign nationals. When
members of Congress also learned that the Bush Administration was
attempting to allow foreign nationals to control certain aspects of U.S.
airlines’ operations, they were equally concerned. During hearings held by
the House of Representatives Aviation Subcommittee, many Representatives,

212
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including Representative Oberstar, opposed the Department’s proposal and
argued that the Department lacked authority to modify its policy on control
without Congressional action.217 Many Representatives took a harsh stance
on national security as midterm elections were approaching.218 As the State
Department’s John Byerly, the lead negotiator at the time for the United
States for its air transport agreements, later explained, the Department’s
attempt to change its policy
ran into a firestorm of opposition in the United States, based on
national security concerns and homeland security concerns. It
was eventually melded into the huge battle over the Dubai
Ports controversy in the United States. And after a full year
and plenty of battle scars to show for it, the Administration has
decided this simply is not going to work . . . . It’s not politically
possible at this time.219
It had become clear that any change in approach concerning foreign
ownership and control matters would have to be accepted by Congress.220
Liberalization proponents have long advocated that Congress should relax
the U.S. law that restricts ownership and control of U.S. airlines.221 Some
argue that such Congressional action is necessary to fully implement the
open skies program, facilitate investment in U.S. air carriers, help ensure the
long-term financial health of the U.S. aviation industry, and guarantee that
U.S carriers remain competitive.222 While proponents of full liberalization
offer various approaches for relaxing ownership restrictions, most seem to
agree that certain conditions should be met before foreign investors enjoy
increased involvement with U.S. airlines.223 For example, they would favor
legislation that permits unlimited foreign voting and nonvoting equity
217
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investment in U.S. airlines by citizens of countries that afford reciprocal
investment opportunities for U.S. citizens in their air carriers.224 This would
provide an incentive for protectionist countries to relax their foreign
ownership restrictions.225 They suggest suspending foreign ownership and
control restrictions on a nation-by-nation basis through bilateral or
multilateral air transport agreements once legislation is adopted.226
Another condition would be to relax U.S. ownership and control
restrictions only as part of the open skies program.227 Foreign nations would
be required to adopt the key elements of the open skies program and
incorporate them into the country’s air transport agreement with the United
States.228 This condition would encourage more nations to liberalize their
overall air transport policies and bring them in line with the open skies
approach.229
A third condition would be to allow only those trusted individuals or
entities that are not owned, controlled, or subsidized by foreign governments
to invest in and help manage U.S. airlines.230 This would ensure that foreign,
government-influenced, and government-subsidized air carriers would not
operate in the U.S. market and obtain an unfair competitive advantage.231
While Congressional action is viewed as the primary obstacle to deeper
liberalization within the aviation industry, it is uncertain whether Congress is
ready to amend U.S. law.232 As occurred during the Department’s attempt to
change its policy on foreign nationals controlling some aspects of U.S.
airline’s operations, Members of Congress may remain concerned about
political backlash from their constituents, especially those who are union
members or who fear that service to small communities will be cancelled if
foreign nationals are involved in management decisions.233 Members of
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Congress may also want to avoid appearing weak on national security issues
and preventing foreign interests from becoming involved in U.S. business.
To overcome these challenges, some have suggested that the U.S. airline
industry, executive agencies, non-governmental policy, and academic
communities work more closely with Congress to educate legislators on
investment issues affecting carriers, including the unique nature of the
industry and the need for access to global capital.234 Many Members of
Congress do not appreciate the effect that the U.S. ownership restriction has
on the U.S. aviation industry or what the economic impact could be if the
statute was amended. To do this, however, there must be greater consensus
among airlines as to exactly how far Congress should go in relaxing the
ownership and control restriction.
2. Security Issues
The widely accepted belief that relaxing foreign investment restrictions
would result in an increased threat to national security is another significant
obstacle to ownership reform.235 Recall that national security concerns stem
primarily from the Defense Department’s (DoD) fear that allowing foreign
ownership and control of U.S. air carriers would result in an inability to rely
on U.S. carriers for airlift service during military emergencies under the
CRAF program,236 and that “international political developments could
create conflicts of interest that undermine an airline’s commitments to
CRAF.”237 For example, foreign owners may receive requests or orders from
their foreign government that contradict DoD orders.
Proponents of deeper liberalization, however, have suggested several
approaches for resolving this issue. First, they point out that, according to a
study requested by the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Transportation Policy and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses,
“[i]f strong risk-management safeguards were adopted, DoD could
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effectively manage the CRAF program to meet national security
requirements, even if the US government were to raise the current ceiling on
foreign ownership and control.”238 Further, liberalization proponents
underscore DoD’s current use of foreign flag air carriers for military
transport, its explicit policy permitting reliance on such carriers, and
extensive use of foreign-owned container lines for transport by sea, to
undermine DoD’s position regarding foreign ownership and control of U.S.
air carriers.239 They also observe that U.S. air carriers owned or controlled
by foreign nationals could be required to remain or become U.S.-flagged,
rendering them subject to all U.S. laws, including those statutes that penalize
airlines for failure to fulfill their CRAF obligations.240 Penalties could be
severe enough to require performance even in the face of contradictory
requirements from a foreign government. And, to mitigate any impact on
diplomatic relations, DoD could rely on obligations contained in the
contractual agreements to guarantee participation in the CRAF program,
including termination in the event that the U.S. carrier did not comply with
its CRAF obligations.241 In addition, the Department could revoke the
airline’s operating certificate.
DoD could also require a foreign-owned airline to provide a standby letter
of credit that would be payable to DoD if the airline does not meet its CRAF
obligations.242 Standby letters of credit are used to insure or guarantee
performance of obligations on the part of a seller of a service or goods.243
Some have also suggested that foreign investment could only be
permitted in accordance with a mutual protection pact.244
Foreign
investment in U.S. airlines would only be allowed if the investor is from a
country with which the United States has entered into an accord “in which
the parties agree to render mutual aid in the event of armed attack on one of
the parties.”245 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides an example
of such an accord.246 The ANZUS treaty with Australia is another
238
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example.247 Other such treaties exist with Japan, South Korea, and the
Philippines.248 Some countries from the western hemisphere are parties to
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.249 Under a mutual
protection regime, nationals from Australia, Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, many western hemisphere countries, and NATO countries—
including Canada, Turkey, and much of Europe—would be eligible to invest
in U.S. air carriers.250
3. Labor Issues
U.S. labor unions are generally opposed to relaxing foreign ownership
restrictions. Opposition stems primarily from fear that foreign owners and
managers of U.S. airlines would replace U.S. employees with employees
from their home countries251 or cheap, unqualified labor from third countries.
Liberalization proponents argue that this concern is unwarranted. They look
to similar U.S. industries that are not subject to foreign ownership
restrictions and assert that foreign investment did not have a detrimental
effect on American jobs.252 Proponents further assert that liberalization of
the ownership and control restrictions would permit additional investment in

(“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
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and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”)).
247
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U.S. airlines and prevent job losses.253 With access to foreign capital, U.S.
airlines would become more competitive and gain better financial health.
They would not have to resort to layoffs in order to save on costs.
Liberalization supporters also assert that protectionist measures will only
result in weakening U.S. companies and increase, rather than mitigate, the
threat to U.S. jobs.254 They claim that access to foreign capital would help
U.S. airlines grow and expand their domestic and international networks,
help them compete with so-called “foreign super carriers,” and remain viable
U.S. employers.255 By way of additional measures to ensure U.S. jobs are
protected, liberalization proponents suggest that the government require that
all or a certain portion of the airline crew of a foreign-owned, U.S.-flagged
airline be composed of U.S. citizens.256
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), in particular, is opposed to
liberalization of the ownership restrictions on the grounds that its members
would be negatively impacted because U.S. labor laws do not cover foreign
airlines.257 ALPA also insists that there would be a “race to the bottom” in
regard to treatment and protection of airline employees because airlines will
attempt to evade strict labor laws by transforming themselves into foreign
corporations.258 According to the U.S. Department of Transportation,
however, U.S. laws and regulations applicable to U.S. carriers and collective
bargaining agreements between employees and the airlines prevent foreign
investors from evading requirements under U.S. labor laws.259 Further, even
though U.S. airlines may become owned or controlled by foreign investors,
they would be obligated to remain U.S.-flagged airlines in order to continue
operating in the U.S. domestic market.260 Such U.S.-flag carriers are subject
to U.S. labor laws.
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ALPA has also argued that increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines
could lead to consolidation and airlines operating long haul routes would use
foreign crews.261 This would force U.S. airlines to reduce international
service, shrinking opportunities for U.S. crews to operate these coveted
routes that provide an opportunity to earn higher wages.262 Liberalization
proponents respond that if the domestic market is opened up to allow free
entry, airlines will expand international service because it represents the best
opportunity for profit.263 They predict that international service would not
decrease enough to cause job loss for U.S. crews.264
In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has proposed that a
foreign carrier acquiring a U.S. carrier could be required to ensure that the
U.S. airline will retain the same percentage of combined total available seat
miles that it had as of a date six months prior to announcing the
acquisition.265 The ABA has also suggested that the U.S. government and
the relevant foreign governments establish a legal framework containing fair
procedures to regulate labor representation and collective bargaining on
multinational airline systems.266
Before Negotiations for the 2010 Agreement were underway, the
European Commission held two aviation forums on liberalization and labor
in order to facilitate discussions between stakeholders and decision makers
on labor issues linked to the U.S.–EU agreement.267 These forums were
organized through the support of labor organizations in both the United
States and the European Union.268 Over seventy individuals from U.S. and
EU Member State Governments, unions, European and U.S. airlines,
academia, labor experts, and officials from the European Commission
participated in the forums.269
During the forums, employee representatives voiced their concerns with
the 2007 Agreement and efforts to negotiate and conclude the 2010
261
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Agreement. The main concern held by pilot representatives, for example,
related to the impact that ownership and control reforms would have on
employee and union rights in trans-national operations.270 For labor, the
problem was that operations under the multilateral agreement would affect
rights airline employees at the national level traditionally enjoyed—that is—
the right to collectively organize, negotiate, agree, and enforce agreements at
the company level.271 They questioned how these rights could be protected
for workers employed in the United States and European airline companies
based in more than one country.272 According to European labor groups, this
issue arose within Europe as commercial freedoms granted to airlines were
not matched by developments in social protection, which, to complicate
matters, are based in Europe on differing national regimes.273
A number of different approaches for ensuring employee representation
in a trans-national environment were discussed. One approach was the use
of trans-national agreements dealing with social matters in trans-national
companies, such as agreements struck between airlines and their
employees.274 It was noted that these voluntary agreements are common at
the global and European level, but there lacks a clear international legal
framework for their enforcement.275 Additionally, while they frame broad
principles of the employee–employer relationship at the company level,
national-level agreements between employees and their employers address
the details.276 The scope of these agreements is narrow as well and many
merely address consultation procedures during a company’s restructuring.277
Next, some of the forum attendees suggested that a multinational
convention on the rights of airline workers could be a way forward.278 This
approach would address the need for harmonized national labor standards for
270
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aviation workers.279 A multinational convention has addressed similar issues
in the maritime industry and the forum examined that industry’s experience
in this area.280 Participants in the maritime industry reported on recent
updates and revisions to the Maritime Labor Convention and the need to
tackle the problem of inadequate standards. They explained that what
became the Maritime Labor Convention of 2006 (MLC) established a new
set of basic standards that all members of the International Labor
Organisation (ILO) must apply.281 According to the presenters, the MLC
covers minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a vessel, conditions
of employment, hours of work and rest, wages, leave, repatriation,
accommodations, recreational facilities, food and catering, occupational
safety and health protection, medical care, welfare, and social security
protection.282 For them, enforcement of the standards remains an issue and
much of that responsibility is placed upon port authorities to inspect a
vessel’s certification.283 However, it was noted that, for the most part, the
MLC is viewed as a positive step for those employed in the maritime
industry. The presenters further explained that the MLC’s implementation is
still being closely monitored.284 While the MLC could be examined further
when considering whether a multinational convention on airline workers’
rights would be a viable solution, the maritime model may not be an exact
fit. Many of labor’s concerns, such as flags of convenience have not been
adequately addressed in the maritime industry.
How to ensure common labor standards was further addressed.
Approaches to establishing common standards can vary in form, including
unenforceable policies or declarations, as well as treaties, which are
enforceable.285 It was stressed that involvement of the relevant unions was
essential to the process.286 Scandinavian Airlines’ (S.A.S.) experience was
examined as it was underscored as successful in securing common standards
across the company since its creation in the 1950s. S.A.S. used a single
contract that was enforceable under Swedish law and had been in operation
279
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through three rounds of restructuring since the late 1970s.287 One
commentator also pointed out during this discussion that the emphasis should
be on the quality as well as the quantity of jobs when establishing common
labor standards.288
A final approach examined during the forums was the convergence of
labor law. In particular, participants examined the steps that would be
required to ensure convergence in the labor laws of the parties to a treaty.
Practical and political obstacles were addressed. A forum participant from
the EC’s Legal Service emphasized that the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement
expressly excluded certain areas of social policy from action at the EU level,
including pay, right of association, social security, and the right to strike.289
Consequently, the EC could not table proposals on any such issues unless
jointly with the Member States.290
A representative from the European Cockpit Association (ECA) noted
that the ECA is a strong supporter of regulatory convergence as a means of
improving standards in the industry in the areas of security, safety, and
economic regulation and that a similar approach could work for social
matters.291 The main issue, however, was ensuring recognition of existing
arrangements such as negotiated collective bargaining agreements.292 He
stated that when combined with information sharing and a common set of
labor standards, there should be a basis for an effective and sustainable
dialogue between employees and employers.
An ALPA representative added that granting greater commercial freedom
to airlines should not dilute the protections offered to workers.293 According
to ALPA, the best way to approach this issue was to provide for a single
labor law in Europe based on the provisions of the U.S. Railway Labor Act,
which provides clear procedures for the selection of bargaining
representatives, a clear negotiation framework, a dispute resolution
procedure, and a clear enforcement mechanism.294 The bottom line for
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ALPA was protecting four fundamental rights: the ability to organize,
negotiate, agree, and enforce collectively.295
In terms of moving forward, a number of groups developed
methodologies for incorporating social considerations into the second stage
of the EU–U.S. negotiations.296 The formulas varied, but all suggested that
the 2010 Agreement should include the four fundamental rights underscored
by ALPA. The EC and other participants agreed to develop these and other
ideas for inclusion in the 2010 Agreement.297
While the 2010 Agreement does not include precise terms guaranteeing
the four fundamental rights suggested by certain attendees at the EC labor
forums, it does include a new article pursuant to which parties agree to be
guided by principles that do not undermine labor related rights.298 Further,
the Joint Committee, on which both ECA and ALPA have a seat, is
empowered to “develop appropriate responses to concerns found to be
legitimate.”299 In addition, in the Memorandum of Consultations relating to
the 2010 Agreement, the EC acknowledges challenges related to
representation of cross-border mobility of workers and commits to informing
the Joint Committee about initiatives to improve implementation,
application, and enforcement in this area.300 In this way, the 2010
Agreement recognizes labor representatives’ concerns associated with
liberalizing the aviation industry.301 ECA noted that it knows of no other air
transport agreement that includes such far-reaching social protections.
According to the ECA, the clauses ultimately incorporated into the 2010
Agreement ensure that growth flowing from the agreement’s benefits
employees as well as consumers.302 However, they argue that appropriate
tools still do not exist to allow airlines to operate in accordance with a clear,
unduplicated set of rules and to prevent airlines from playing one set of
295
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standards against another, promoting a race to the bottom in regard to
employment protection.303 As currently structured, the arrangement permits
airlines to exploit differences in employment regulation.304 While ECA
acknowledged that the 2007 Agreement and the 2010 Agreement are both
successful and groundbreaking in many ways, “they are not complete and
will eventually fail unless we follow up with complementary regulatory
changes.”305
While ALPA appreciates the work that the U.S. and EU negotiators
undertook in exploring and attempting to address labor’s concerns during the
second stage negotiations, ALPA remains cautious as to how the clauses on
labor rights will be applied.306 In the meantime, however, ALPA views these
new provisions as a promising and meaningful development; the provisions
should serve as a model for similar terms to be included in other air service
agreements.307 ALPA also appreciated the fact that the 2010 Agreement
amended Article 21 of the 2007 Agreement by setting up a process for
addressing the possibility of removing market access barriers.308 ALPA
approves of the new Article 21 allowing careful consideration of the
implications of further removal of market access barriers and changes to
labor and other laws.309
Any attempt to liberalize foreign ownership restrictions may have to
include protective labor provisions to be politically viable. Some supporters
of broader liberalization acknowledge that labor must be fully included in the
liberalization process. By participating fully in negotiations, discussions,
and the adoption of specific measures, labor may become supportive of
certain aspects of liberalization, particularly if assurances concerning job
preservation are included in the process. Providing access to capital and
improving the financial health of U.S. airlines will have to be done in a way
to ensure that all stakeholders, including U.S. labor, benefit from the result.
303
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4. Multilateral Approaches
a. The Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International
Air Transportation
Some observers suggest that recent accomplishments in the form of the
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement serve as a model for additional multilateral
agreements involving broader liberalization. They also point to the
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air
Transportation (MALIAT) and IATA’s Agenda for Freedom as evidence of
other concerted efforts to advance liberalization.310 The U.S. joined Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore in forming the MALIAT in
2001.311 MALIAT was among the first multilateral air transport agreements
to include open skies provisions and appeared to deepen liberalization.312
One of MALIAT’s provisions states that the parties will grant authorizations
to an airline designated by one of the other parties to provide international
service, as long as it is incorporated and has its principal place of business in
the territory of another party and “effective control of that airline is vested in
the designating Party, its nationals, or both.”313 Notably absent from
MALIAT’s conditions for obtaining authorization to serve another party’s
territory is the requirement that nationals of the designating party actually
own the airline.314 While MALIAT also sets forth a provision stating that
nothing in the agreement will be deemed to affect a party’s ownership and
control laws, thus preserving the U.S. ownership and control regime, it is
significant that the United States executed an agreement that does not
necessarily require an airline to be owned by a party’s nationals in order to
operate under the agreement.315 Like the U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement,
MALIAT serves as a model multilateral agreement that could be used for
pursuing deeper liberalization.
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Regarding

the

In 2008, IATA developed its Agenda for Freedom, which is a process
focused on encouraging governments around the world to grant airlines the
commercial freedom to operate like any other global business.316 IATA’s
Director General and CEO at the time, Giovanni Bisignani, launched the
initiative at IATA’s Annual General Meeting held in Istanbul in June
2008.317 At that meeting, attendees adopted what is known as the Istanbul
Declaration, which calls for a change to rules that limit the foreign ownership
of airlines.318 Given the crisis in existence at that time in terms of fuel costs,
limited access to capital, and the overall aviation industry’s poor financial
health, IATA determined it was incumbent upon it, as the industry’s global
association, to create a process to encourage governments to allow airlines to
operate like any other business.319 IATA found that an Agenda for Freedom
was necessary because airlines are required to conduct business under a web
of bilateral Government-to-Government treaties that are out of date with
commercial realities.320 IATA found that the treaties severely restrict cross
border consolidation through restrictive ownership and control clauses,
which have a direct effect on the industry’s poor financial performance over
time.321 According to IATA, if the airline industry was financially healthy, it
would be in a much better position to fuel economic growth and job
creation.322
Fifteen governments and the European Commission were invited to
participate in what became the Istanbul Summit held later that year in
October 2008.323 It was also open to any other country desiring to engage in
the process of liberalizing ownership and control rules.324 Representatives
from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Commission, India,
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab
316
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ro/Pages/faq.aspx#4 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.

2011]

U.S.–EU SECOND STAGE AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT

721

Emirates, United States, and Vietnam attended the Summit.325 During the
Summit, Mr. Bisignani circulated a paper proposing ways in which
governments can provide airlines more commercial freedom to adapt to a
rapidly changing business environment.326 One proposal was for countries to
unilaterally waive, but not revoke, key clauses in the bilaterals that prevent
airlines from enjoying commercial freedom, primarily in the area of
ownership and control clauses and traffic rights clauses.327 Participating
countries would only suspend the clauses they choose with the country or
countries they choose either on a conditional and/or reciprocal basis.328 The
proposal’s goal was to create rapid progress on liberalization while at the
same time providing assurances for countries that they would remain in
control of their own liberalization efforts.329
Another proposal discussed at the Istanbul Summit was to create a
multilateral treaty on waiving nationality clauses in existing bilateral
agreements.330 While similar to the first proposal, it used a different legal
instrument.331 It also did not include mechanisms to eliminate limitations on
market access.
A third proposal, to draft a multilateral statement of policy principles,
also emerged.332 The principles would commit signatory governments to
apply existing and future bilateral agreements in a liberal manner in
exchange for their bilateral partners doing the same.333 Certain summit
participants preferred this approach to the waiver approach because it gave
them more control over the degree of liberalization and their choice of
partners.334 At the conclusion of the Istanbul Summit, the participants agreed
that further liberalization would be desirable and that they should consider
the three proposals.335
After the Istanbul Summit, IATA conducted economic studies on the
impact of liberalization and researched best practices for liberalization from
325
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around the world.336 It also prepared an initial draft of what became the
Statement of Policy Principles regarding the Implementation of Bilateral Air
Services Agreements (Statement of Policy Principles).337 According to
IATA, the goal of the Statement of Policy Principles was to call on countries
to apply the terms of the existing bilateral agreements, and negotiate new
agreements, in a liberal manner. IATA coordinated with the Istanbul
Summit participants on developing the draft Statement of Policy Principles
so that it would be acceptable to the maximum number of countries
committed to liberalization.338
Mr. Bisignani organized a second Agenda for Freedom summit, which
was held in Montebello, Canada in November 2009.339 Those governments
that indicated their willingness to endorse the Statement of Policy Principles
were invited to attend the Montebello Summit. Chile, the European
Commission, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, United Arab
Emirates, and the United States participated in this second summit, and all
but the European Commission signed the final version of the Statement of
Policy Principles. The European Commission endorsed it.340
The Statement of Policy Principles addresses four main areas. The first is
freedom to access capital markets. Signatory countries agreed not to
exercise bilateral rights to block international service from airlines with nonnational ownership structures.341 The second main area is the freedom to do
business. Participating governments agreed to focus on reducing restrictions
on market access and to expedite further opening of markets in future
bilateral agreements.342 The freedom to price services is also addressed.
Under this freedom, signatory countries agreed to focus on allowing greater
freedom for airlines to price services in line with market realities.343 The last
main area addressed is the need for fair competition. Participating countries
agreed that the parties could not be expected to implement the foregoing
principles with governments that pursue policies designed to secure an
unlevel playing field for their national carriers.344 According to IATA, the
336
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Statement of Policy Principles is a significant document that can be effective
because governments have adopted these principles in an official capacity,
and it will form the basis for bilateral negotiations.345
The Statement of Policy Principles is open to the endorsement of any
government interested in promoting liberalization.346 IATA and the
signatory countries promote the Statement of Policy Principles around the
world, and IATA has held regional workshops for such purposes and to seek
additional endorsements.347 So far, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Qatar
have joined the original Montebello Summit Participants by either signing or
endorsing the Statement of Policy Principles.348
The IATA Agenda for Freedom provides another vehicle to move
forward on a multilateral basis and broaden liberalization principles even
further. However, as long as the participating countries’ domestic laws
restrict airline ownership and control, such as those of the United States, the
multilateral approach for liberalization will remain limited or simply move
forward and leave behind those countries unwilling to liberalize their
regimes. It is possible that increased competition from, and success enjoyed
by, more liberal countries’ airlines will pressure legislators in the United
States and similar countries to consider adopting modifications to the
ownership and control restrictions in order to allow their airlines the same
freedoms.
VIII. CONCLUSION
International air transport systems are critical to modern economies, and
the U.S.–EU trans-Atlantic market has always been a market leader. The
2007 Agreement and 2010 Agreement were significant steps forward in
providing a more efficient, more effective, and more stable air transport
system. While moving forward on the remaining obstacles to a true open
aviation area may be difficult, the required hard work and continuing
negotiations are certainly worthwhile. U.S. aviation policy was during my
time as Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs and
345
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continues to be based upon three main goals. First, to ensure in the short
term that the system is able to function efficiently and meet the economic
and security needs of the nation. Second, over the long term to promote
open international markets, fair competition, and minimal government
intervention in markets. And, third, to establish common international
standards that will ensure a safe, efficient, and environmentally sound global
transportation system. The pursuit of such goals has not come easy, and the
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement is a remarkable achievement. With the
approval of the Agreement these three goals have advanced.
Obviously, however, issues have and will continue to arise which hinder
progress and challenge our resolve to achieve further liberalization. The
U.S.–EU Open Skies Agreement has established fruitful efforts under the
U.S.–EU Joint Committee, and perhaps defined a prudent manner in which
to move forward toward convergence in areas such as safety, security, and
interoperability and compatibility of air traffic systems.
Genuine
possibilities exist for advancing larger issues, such as foreign ownership and
control of air carriers. Eventually, the market will demand that this issue be
resolved. What I said at the opening of the Dean Rusk Center conference in
2003 on the Trans-Atlantic Relationship remains true today:
Industries of all kinds are moving toward more open and
vigorous global competition as consumers demand new
services and products. Participation in such a dynamic world
economy can pose huge challenges as well as opportunities for
both individuals and industries. The most promising way
forward is to continue to rise to the challenge of competition in
the international marketplace.
North Americans and
Europeans, like other peoples, can and must compete, not
retreat, in the face of global competition. You cannot reap the
benefits of free trade if you cannot move people and goods
freely.349
In such an environment it is imperative that the aviation industry and
governments continue to review and revise the trans-Atlantic air transport
market. We have begun to replace the isolated bilateral aviation markets that
were created under the existing system of the Chicago Convention. We must
349
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now continue to work toward a true single, open, worldwide aviation market
for the twenty-first century; and, in doing so, ensure that all stakeholders
participate in the economic benefits of such a vibrant market.

